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Abstract. We construct a perfectly binding string commitment scheme
whose security is based on the learning parity with noise (LPN) assump-
tion, or equivalently, the hardness of decoding random linear codes. Our
scheme not only allows for a simple and efficient zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge for committed values (essentially a Σ-protocol), but also for
such proofs showing any kind of relation amongst committed values, i.e.,
proving that messages m0, . . . ,mu, are such that m0 = C(m1, . . . ,mu)
for any circuit C.
To get soundness which is exponentially small in a security parameter t,
and when the zero-knowledge property relies on the LPN problem with
secrets of length `, our 3 round protocol has communication complexity
O(t|C|` log(`)) and computational complexity of O(t|C|`) bit operations.
The hidden constants are small, and the computation consists mostly of
computing inner products of bit-vectors.
1 Introduction
Commitment schemes and zero-knowledge proofs are fundamental cryptographic
primitives. In this work we propose a simple string commitment scheme and show
efficient zero-knowledge proofs for any relation amongst committed values. The
security (more precisely, the computational hiding property) of our commitment
scheme relies on the learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption, or equivalently,
on the hardness of decoding random linear codes.
Commitment schemes. A commitment scheme allows a party to commit to a
message m by publishing a commitment σ, and this commitment can be opened
at a later point in time. The security properties required are called the hiding
and binding property. Hiding means that one cannot learn anything about the
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committed message m from the commitment σ, binding means that one cannot
open a commitment σ to two different messages m 6= m′.
In our scheme, the commitment to a message m is simply the encoding of m
using a random linear code, with some noise added to the codeword. Exploiting
the linear structure of this scheme, we get simple and efficient zero-knowledge
proofs for linear and multiplicative relations of committed values.
Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge are
two party protocols, which allow a prover to convince a verifier that it knows
some secret piece of information, without the verifier being able to learn anything
about the secret value except for what is revealed by the claim itself.
The LPN assumption. The computationally hard problem underlying the secu-
rity (i.e., the computational hiding property) of our commitment scheme is the
learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption. This problem asks to distinguish
“noisy” linear equations A.s⊕ e from uniformly random. Here A is a “skinny”
public random binary k× ` matrix, s is a uniformly random ` bit secret and e is
a random vector of low weight (the exact distribution of e is discussed in §2.2).
The LPN problem has found numerous applications as the assumption underlying
provably secure cryptosystems, like symmetric encryption [ACPS09,GRS08] or
secret-key [HB01,JW05,KSS10,KPC+11] and public-key [Ste93] authentication
schemes.
LPN based cryptosystems are interesting for theoretical and practical rea-
sons. On the one hand, the LPN problem is equivalent to the problem of de-
coding random linear codes, a problem that has been studied for over half a
century [BMvT78,BFKL93,BKW03,Kea98,Reg05]. The best known algorithms
need 2Θ(`/ log `) time and samples (the number of samples is given by the number
k of rows of A) [BKW03]. If k = Θ(`) is linear in `, as it will be the case in
this paper, the best algorithms need exponential 2Θ(`) time. Furthermore, unlike
most number-theoretic problems used in cryptography, the LPN problem is not
known to become insecure against quantum algorithms. On the practical side,
LPN based cryptosystems tend to be extremely simple and efficient, and thus are
good candidates for weak devices like RFID tags, where existing cryptographic
algorithms cannot be implemented due to constraints on code-size, running-time
or memory.
1.1 Our Contributions
Commitments from LPN. In our scheme the commitment to a message m ∈ Iv
(where I def= {0, 1}) is simply
Com(m) = A.(r‖m)⊕ e,
where A = A′‖A′′ ∈ Ik×(`+v) is a public random binary matrix, r ∈ I` is a
uniformly random vector and e ∈ Ik is a random low-weight vector. To open a
commitment σ, one reveals r,m, e and checks if σ
?
= A.(r‖m)⊕ e and e is low
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weight. Here the length ` = |r| is chosen such that the LPN problem with secrets
of length ` is hard. The length v = |m| of the message can be arbitrary, but for
efficiency reasons it is best to choose it roughly of the same size as `.
Setting k = Θ(v + `) large enough, the commitment scheme becomes com-
putationally hiding and perfectly binding (with overwhelming probability over
the choice of A). The binding property follows by the large distance of the code
generated by the random matrix A, the hiding property follows directly from
the LPN assumption which implies that A′.r ⊕ e is pseudorandom.
Zero-knowledge protocols for arbitrary circuits. We construct a zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge, which is basically a so called Σ-protocol, that allows to prove
knowledge of the message m hidden inside a commitment without revealing
anything about it. Furthermore, we give a protocol for proving that committed
messages m0,m1,m2 satisfy a linear relation m0 = X1.m1 ⊕X2.m2 (for any
square matrices X1,X2). Based on this protocol, we construct proofs for any
bitwise relations m0 = m1 ◦m2, where ◦ can be any bitwise relation like AND,
NAND, OR, NOR. As NAND is functionally complete, we can prove relations
m0 = C(m1, . . . ,mt) for any boolean circuit C.
For A ∈ Ik×m, the communication complexity of our proofs is Θ(k log k).
Setting v = `, we can set k = Θ(v + `) = Θ(v), thus the proofs are quasilinear
in the length of the committed messages. The soundness error of our protocol is
2/3. To get soundness errors of 2−16 and 2−32 as specified by the ISO/IEC-9798-5
standard we would need 28 and 55 repetitions, respectively.
As one application (which we bring up to compare our scheme to existing
schemes in the related work section below) consider an NP language L = {x :
∃w : R(x,w) = 1}. Our scheme can be used to prove knowledge of a witness
w for x ∈ L as follows: commit to m0 = w and m1 = 1 and prove that the
committed values satisfy the relation Cx(m0) = m1 where Cx(.) is the circuit
computing the NP relation R(x, .). This proofs avoid expensive Karp reductions
(to 3-coloring or Hamiltonian cycles) used in classical proofs.
1.2 Related Work
Our basic scheme for proving knowledge of a committed value is similar to
Stern’s [Ste93] zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the syndrome decoding
problem, which can be seen as the “dual” of the LPN problem, and both are
known to beNP-complete [BMvT78]. Subsequent to Stern’s work, Ve´ron [Ve´r96]
proposed a Σ-protocol for proving knowledge of an LPN secret. However, as we
will show in Appendix A, there is a gap in the proof of the zero-knowledge
property of his protocol. Recently, several works have extended Stern’s protocol
to construct efficient identification schemes from various lattice-based and cod-
ing based assumptions (see [CLRS10,CVA10,KTX08] and references therein).
In particular, Cayrel et al. [CVA10] constructed an identification scheme with
knowledge error 1/2 based on the q-ary syndrome decoding problem. However,
this improvement in the knowledge error adds two additional rounds to the
protocol, and thus their construction does not decrease the total number of
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rounds required to reach a specified knowledge error. Very recently, Asharov et
al. [AJLA+12] constructed Σ-protocols for various learning with errors (LWE)
related languages. We note that the ZK property of their protocols crucially
relies on the ability to use large noise to “smudge out” small differences in dis-
tributions. Unfortunately, this technique does not extend to the setting of LPN
(which is the focus of this work). We finally note that all the aforementioned
works only construct ZK protocols for specific languages and, unlike our work,
do not consider the general problem of constructing ZK proofs for circuit satis-
fiability.
During the last decades, a large body of work on efficient interactive and non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs and arguments of knowledge has been pub-
lished, see, e.g., [BDP00,CD97,CD98,CD09,GS08,IKOS07,KR06,KMO90,KP98]
and the references therein. For ZK arguments (as opposed to proofs), where the
soundness property is only required to hold against computationally bounded
malicious provers, one can construct schemes which asymptotically only require
polylogarithmic communication (e.g., the interactive argument based on CRHFs
[Kil92] or the non-interactive argument in the random-oracle model [Mic00]).
These schemes rely on probabilistically checkable proofs (PCP), and are not
really practical.
The beautiful work of Ishai et al. [IKOS07] on zero-knowledge proofs from
secure multiparty computation aims at a similar goal as this work. They show
how to construct ZK proofs from MPC; When instantiated with simple MPC
protocols like GMW [GMW87] they get ZK proofs for showing knowledge of a
witness w such that R(x,w) = 1 with communication complexity O(ts), where
2−t is the soundness error and s is the size of the circuit computing the relation
R(x, .), which is the same asymptotic behavior we get (as explained in the pre-
vious section). Using protocols relying on sophisticated secret sharing schemes
for constant-size fields based on algebraic-geometric codes [CC06] they even get
an asymptotic communication complexity of O(s)+poly(t, log s), but due to the
large hidden constants in such codes this scheme will only be more efficient than
the simpler scheme for very large circuits.
A ZK proof for any NP relation can of course be used to prove any relation
amongst committed values, but in general this would be rather expensive as the
computation of the opening of the commitment must be part of the description
of the relation. In contrast, our ZK proofs work directly on committed values,
and we do not pay extra for this. Proving relations amongst committed values
has been considered before, see [CD09] and references therein. These works give
very efficient proofs for algebraic circuits over large fields, but are less suited
for circuits over very small ones, in particular, for Z2 as in boolean circuits. As
an application, consider the case where we need to prove that committed values
satisfy m0 = AES(m1,m2), i.e., m0 is the output of the AES block-cipher
under key m1 on input m2.
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1.3 Outline
We introduce some notation and recapitulate the basic definitions required for
this paper in Section 2. In Section 3 we present a very simple commitment
scheme based on the hardness of the LPN problem. Protocols allowing one to
prove knowledge of the content of such commitments, and relations among them,
are presented in Section 4. We finally conclude in Section 5. A flaw in an earlier
zero-knowledge proof for the LPN-problem is shown Appendix A.
2 Preliminaries
We use bold lower-case and upper-case letters like a,A to denote vectors and
matrices, respectively. Probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms are writ-
ten by sans-serif letters like A. Calligraphic letters like A always denote sets. We
write a
R←A if a was drawn uniformly at random from set A, a R← χ if a was
drawn according to some probability distribution χ, and a
R←A if a is the output
of a randomized algorithm A.
We denote the set {0, 1} by I, thus Ik denotes the set of strings of length
k. The Hamming weight of a ∈ Ik is denoted by ‖a‖1 =
∑k
i=1 a[i]. With
Ikw = {a ∈ Ik : ‖a‖1 = w} we denote the set of all k-bit vectors of weight
exactly w. The all-zeros and all-ones vectors of length k are denoted by 0k and
1k, respectively. The concatenation of vectors a and b is written as a‖b. The
symmetric group on k elements (i.e., the set of all permutations on k elements)
is denoted Sk. For pi ∈ Sk and a ∈ Ik, pi(b) denotes the string a[i] = b[pi(i)].
2.1 Commitment Schemes
Definition 2.1. A triple of algorithms (KGen,Com,Ver) is called a commitment
scheme if it satisfies the following:
– On input 1`, the key generation algorithm KGen outputs a public commitment
key pk.
– The commitment algorithm Com takes as inputs a message m from a message
spaceM and a commitment key pk, and outputs a commitment/opening pair
(c, d).
– The verification algorithm Ver takes a key pk, a message m, a commitment
c and an opening d and outputs 1 or 0.
The commitment scheme we construct satisfies the following security properties:
– Correctness: Ver evaluates to 1 whenever the inputs were computed by an
honest party, i.e.,
Pr[Ver(pk,m, c, d) = 1; pk
R← KGen(1`),m ∈M, (c, d) R← Com(m, pk)] = 1
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– Perfect binding : With overwhelming probability over the choice of the public
key pk
R← KGen(1`), no commitment c can be opened in two different ways,
i.e.,
(Ver(pk,m, c, d) = 1) ∧ (Ver(pk,m′, c, d′) = 1)⇒ m = m′
– Computational hiding : A commitment c computationally hides the commit-
ted message: with overwhelming probability over the choice of pk
R←KGen(1`),
for every m,m′ ∈M and (c, d) R←Com(m, pk), (c′, d′) R←Com(m′, pk) the dis-
tributions c and c′ are computationally indistinguishable.
2.2 Learning Parity with Noise
The computational assumption underlying all our constructions is the learning
parity with noise (LPN) assumption. Below we define the decisional version of
LPN in a general form, not yet specifying the error distribution.
Definition 2.2. For k, ` ∈ N, let χ be an error distribution over Ik. The deci-
sional (χ, `, k)-LPN problem is (s, )-hard if for every distinguisher D of size s:∣∣∣∣ Prx,A,e[D(A,A.x⊕ e) = 1]− Prr,A[D(A, r) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 
where A
R← Ik×`, e R← χk, r R← Ik, and x R← I` is fixed and secret. The search
version is defined similarly, but we require that no D can find the secret x:∣∣∣∣ Prx,A,e[D(A,A.x⊕ e) = x
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 
In the standard definition of the LPN problem, the error distribution χ is the
Bernoulli distribution with some parameter 0 < τ < 12 , i.e., every bit e[i] is cho-
sen independently and identically distributed with Pr[e[i] = 1] = τ , we will refer
to this version as LPNτ . As mentioned in the introduction, for k = Θ(`) as used
in this paper, the search version of LPNτ is the same as the problem of decoding
random linear codes, and is believed to be exponentially hard. The search and de-
cision version of LPNτ are known to be equivalent [BFKL93,KSS10], but to show
this search to decision reduction, the number of samples k in the decision version
must be much larger than in the search version (by a factor of Ω(`/)). More
recently, a sample preserving reduction has been shown [AIK09, Lemma 4.4].
(cf. [MM11] for a more general treatment of sample preserving reductions).
Exact LPN. In this work we define a new version of the LPN problem, which we
call exact LPN or xLPN for short. Similar to LPNτ , xLPN is parameterized by
some noise parameter 0 < τ < 12 , and the (search or decision) xLPNτ problem is
defined exactly like LPNτ , except that the Hamming weight of the error vector
is exactly bkτe (not of expected weight kτ as in LPNτ ). That is, e is sampled
uniformly at random from the set Ikbkτe.
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In this work, we assume the hardness of decisional xLPN.4 It is not hard
to see that search xLPNτ is hard iff search LPNτ is hard.
5 Showing equivalence
of decisional xLPNτ and LPNτ version is more tricky. The classical search to
decision reduction for LPNτ from [BFKL93,KSS10] does not work for xLPNτ ,
but the sample preserving reduction [AIK09, Lemma 4.4] does. Summing up, we
have
Proposition 2.3. The hardness of decisional xLPNτ (used in this paper) is poly-
nomially related to the hardness of search LPNτ .
The sample preserving reduction [AIK09, Lemma 4.4] relies on the Goldreich-
Levin theorem, and as a consequence is not very tight. Although we do not know
of significantly more efficient attacks against xLPNτ than against LPNτ , if one
insists on basing the security of our schemes on the standard LPNτ assumption in
a provable manner, one must take the loss in the reduction into account, which
would result in rather large parameters. In Appendix B we show a protocol
for proving knowledge of committed values whose security relies directly on the
standard decisional LPNτ assumption. The protocol given there can be extended
to prove arbitrary relations amongst committed values, in the same manner as
in the case of xLPNτ assumption. However, this protocol is somewhat more
complicated and has a worse soundness error (4/5 as compared to 2/3), and
thus requires roughly twice the number of repetitions in order to achieve the
same knowledge error.
As suggested in [KSS10, Section 5], replacing the LPN assumption with an
assumption where we have a fixed upped bound on the weight of the error
vector (like it is the case in xLPN) would remove the completeness error (and
thus allows for more efficient instantiations) also for other LPN based schemes,
like HB type protocols. We thus think that investigating the exact hardness of
the xLPN-problem is of interest beyond the realm of this work.
2.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge and Σ-Protocols
Informally, a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge is a two party protocol between
a prover P and a verifier V which allows the former to convince the latter that
it knows some secret piece of information without revealing anything about it.
A bit more precisely, in a zero-knowledge proof for a binary relation R, the
parties have common input y and the prover has private input w such that
(y, w) ∈ R. The protocol must then satisfy the following three properties: (i)
For an honest prover, the verifier always accepts (completeness). (ii) For every
4 The security of the basic commitment scheme can be based on decisional LPN, but
our Σ-protocols to prove relations amongst committed values “leak” the weight of
the error vectors. Thus, to be zero-knowledge, we need this value to be fixed.
5 Any D who outputs x with advantage  for xLPNτ , will output the secret x with
advantage at least /
√
k of LPNτ , as the error vector sampled in LPNτ has weight
bkτe with probability ≥ 1/√k, and conditioned on this being the case, the error
distribution is exactly the same as in xLPNτ .
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potentially malicious verifier V∗ there exists a PPT simulator only taking y as
an input whose output is indistinguishable from conversations of V∗ with an
honest prover (zero-knowledge). (iii) From every prover P∗ which can make the
verifier accept with a probability larger than a threshold κ (the knowledge error),
a w′ satisfying (y, w′) ∈ R can be extracted efficiently in a rewindable black-
box way (proof of knowledge). For a formal definition we refer to Bellare and
Goldreich [BG93].
The protocols we are going to design in the following are all instantiations
of the following definition:
Definition 2.4 (Σ-Protocol). Let (P,V) be a two-party protocol, where V is
PPT, and let R be a binary relation. Then (P,V) is called a Σ-protocol for R
with challenge set C, public input y and private input w, if and only if it satisfies
the following conditions:
– 3-move form: The protocol is of the following form:
• The prover P computes a commitment t and sends it to V.
• The verifier V draws a challenge c R←C and sends it to P.
• The prover sends a response s to the verifier.
• Depending on the protocol transcript (t, c, s), the verifier accepts or re-
jects the proof.
The protocol transcript (t, c, s) is called accepting, if the verifier accepts the
protocol run.
– Completeness: The verifier V accepts whenever (y, w) ∈ R.
– Special soundness: There exists a PPT algorithm E (the knowledge ex-
tractor) which takes a set {(t, c, sc) : c ∈ C} of accepting transcripts with the
same commitment as inputs, and outputs w′ such that (y, w′) ∈ R.
– Special honest-verifier zero-knowledge: There exists a PPT algorithm
S (the simulator) taking y and c ∈ C as inputs, and which outputs triples
(t, c, s) whose distribution is (computationally) indistinguishable from accept-
ing protocol transcripts generated by real protocol runs.
It is well known that every Σ-protocol is also a proof of knowledge for the
same relation [Dam04]. However, while in Σ-protocols the existence of a simula-
tor is only required for the honest verifier, zero-knowledge proofs require this exis-
tence for arbitrary, potentially malicious, verifiers. This can be reached by apply-
ing generic standard techniques to Σ-protocols, e.g., Damg˚ard et al. [DGOW95].
We note that our definition of Σ-protocols slightly differs from the stan-
dard definition found in the literature [Cra97,Dam04]. For the special soundness
property, it is typically required that a valid witness can already be computed
given any two accepting conversations with the same commitment but different
challenges. We loosen this definition and only require that w′ can be computed
given valid responses to all challenges for a fixed commitment t. It can easily
be seen that the aforementioned results showing that every Σ-protocol is also a
proof of knowledge still hold true. However, while for the standard definition the
knowledge error is given by 1/#C it is only given by 1−1/#C for Definition 2.4.
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3 Perfectly Binding String Commitments from LPN
Our commitment scheme is parameterized by the main security parameter ` ∈ N,
0 < τ < 0.25, the message length v ∈ N and k ∈ O(` + v). Finally, we set
w = bτke. The algorithms of the commitment scheme are then given as follows:
– KGen: The public commitment key consists of the matrix A = A′‖A′′ ∈
Ik×(`+v), where A′ R←Ik×` and A′′ R←Ik×v.
– Com: The commitment to a message m ∈ Iv is given by A.(r‖m)⊕e, where
r
R←I` and e R←Ikw. The opening of the commitment is given by m and r.
– Ver: Given a commitment c, a message m′ and a randomness r′, a verifier
accepts if and only if e′ = c⊕A.(r′‖m′) has weight w.
Theorem 3.1. Let 0 < τ < 0.25, and `, k, v ∈ N be such that the decisional
xLPNτ problem (with secrets of length ` and k samples) is hard. Let k = Θ(`+v)
be such that with overwhelming probability a randomly chosen generator matrix
of a linear code A ∈ Ik×(`+v) has distance larger than 2w, i.e., ‖A.x‖1 > 2w
for all x ∈ I`+v. Then the above commitment scheme is perfectly binding and
computationally hiding.
Proof. The required security properties can be seen as follows:
Perfect binding. Assume, by contraposition, thatmi, ri, i = 1, 2 are two different
openings for a commitment c. That is, we have that ei = c ⊕ A.(ri‖mi) has
norm at most w for i = 1, 2. Thus we have that e1 ⊕ e2 = A.(r1‖m1 ⊕ r2‖m2)
is a codeword of length ‖e1 ⊕ e2‖1 ≤ ‖e1‖1 + ‖e2‖1 ≤ 2w, contradicting our
assumption on the distance of the code generated by A.
Computational hiding. We have that c = A′.r ⊕ e ⊕ A′′.m. By the xLPNτ -
assumption A′.r ⊕ e, and thus also c, is pseudorandom. uunionsq
4 Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
In this section we first construct a Σ-protocol, which on common input A and
y allows the prover to prove knowledge of a valid opening of y under the com-
mitment scheme presented in Section 3. The protocol borrows some basic ideas
from Stern [Ste93], who gave a Σ-protocol for the syndrome decoding problem.
After presenting this basic protocol, we give two further Σ-protocols. The
first can be used to prove that committed strings satisfy any linear relation. The
second protocol can be used to show that committed strings satisfy any bitwise
relation like bitwise AND, NAND, OR or NOR. As NAND is functionally com-
plete, using this protocol we can construct Σ-protocols for any relation amongst
committed messages.
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4.1 Proving Knowledge of a Valid Opening
The following Σ-protocol proves knowledge of a valid opening for commitments
of the form described in the previous section, i.e., it shows possession of r,m, e
such that y = A.(r‖m) ⊕ e for an error satisfying ‖e‖1 = w. For notational
convenience we will sometimes write s to denote the vector r‖m.
A first idea for such a protocol (which will not quite work) is to mimic
Schnorr’s protocol as follows: (1) the prover P commits to some value t0 =
A.v ⊕ f , (2) the verifier V sends a challenge c R←{0, 1}, (3) the prover opens t0
(i.e., sends v,f) if c = 0 and opens t0 ⊕ y (i.e., sends v ⊕ s,f ⊕ e) if c = 1.
If in this protocol f is sampled such that it has low weight, then e ⊕ f
leaks information about e, and the protocol is not zero-knowledge. On the other
hand, if f is uniformly random (so e⊕f is independent of e), the protocol is not
sound (informally, all we can say is that from answers to both challenges we can
extract s′, e′ where y = A.s′⊕ e′, but e′ can have arbitrary weight, and finding
such a solution is trivial). In our protocol f is chosen uniformly at random, and
to ensure soundness we use a trick from Stern [Ste93]. We additionally commit
to a random permutation pi ∈ Sk and to pi(f), pi(f ⊕ e). On challenge c = 0
and c = 1 we now additionally make sure the openings are consistent with the
committed errors by opening pi and either pi(f) (if c = 0) or pi(f ⊕ e) (if c = 1).
Moreover we extend the challenge space from two to three. The extra challenge
c = 2 is used to verify that the weight of pi(f) ⊕ pi(f ⊕ e) = pi(e) (and thus e)
is small, this will ensure soundness, as from valid answers to all three challenges
we can extract s′, e′ where y = A.s′ ⊕ e′ and e′ has low weight. Opening the
commitments to pi(f), pi(f ⊕ e) on c = 2 does not hurt the ZK property, as
pi(f), pi(f ⊕ e) contains no information about e except its weight.
The common input to P,V is A and y, P’s secret input is (e, s). The pro-
tocol flow is then given as follows, where the commitment scheme Com(.) can
be instantiated by an arbitrary perfectly binding string commitment scheme,
potentially the scheme presented in Section 3 itself.
– P samples a permutation pi
R←Sk at random.
It then draws v
R←I`+v, f R←Ik, and then sends the following commitments
to the verifier V:
C0 ← Com(pi′ = pi, t0 = A.v ⊕ f)
C1 ← Com(t1 = pi(f))
C2 ← Com(t2 = pi(f ⊕ e))
– The verifier draws c
R← Z3 and sends it to P.
– Depending on the value of c, P opens the following commitments:
0. P opens C0, C1 by sending pi
′, t0, t1 and the associated random coins.
1. P opens C0, C2 by sending pi
′, t0, t2 and the associated random coins.
2. P opens C1, C2 by sending t1, t2 and the associated random coins.
– The verifier verifies the correctness of the openings received from the prover,
and additionally performs the following checks depending on the challenge
c:
0. V accepts, iff t0 ⊕ pi′−1(t1)
?∈ img A and pi′ ?∈ Sk.
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1. V accepts, iff t0 ⊕ pi′−1(t2)⊕ y
?∈ img A.
2. V accepts, iff ‖t1 ⊕ t2‖1 = w.
Theorem 4.1. The above protocol is a Σ-protocol for the following relation:
RLPN = {((A,y), (r,m, e)) : y = A.(r‖m)⊕ e ∧ ‖e‖1 = w}
Proof. The 3-move form required for Definition 2.4 is clear. The remaining prop-
erties can be seen as follows.
Completeness. It is easy to see that an honest prover can always convince the
verifier. Depending on the challenge c, we get:
0. t0⊕pi′−1(t1) = (A.v⊕f)⊕pi−1(pi(f)) = A.v ∈ img A and pi is a permutation.
1. t0⊕pi′−1(t2)⊕y = (A.v⊕f)⊕pi−1(pi(f⊕e))⊕(A.s⊕e) = A.(v⊕s) ∈ img A.
2. ‖t1 ⊕ t2‖1 = ‖pi(f)⊕ pi(f ⊕ e)‖1 = ‖pi(f ⊕ f ⊕ e)‖1 = ‖pi(e)‖1 = ‖e‖1 = w.
Special Soundness. Assume that we have fixed values C0, C1, C2 and openings
for all challenges c ∈ Z3, such that the verifier accepts on all of them. Then,
by the assumed perfect binding property of the underlying commitment scheme
Com(.), we know that the openings to identical commitments must be identical
across different challenges.
By adding the verification equations for c = 0 and c = 1 we get that pi′−1(t1⊕
t2) ⊕ y ∈ img A and thus that y = A.s′ ⊕ pi′−1(t1 ⊕ t2), where s′ = (r′‖m′)
is easy to compute. Now, using that ‖t1 ⊕ t2‖1 = w, we have a valid witness of
(A,y) is thus given by (r′,m′, pi′−1(t1 ⊕ t2)).
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge. In the following we describe an efficient simu-
lator S, which for each challenge c ∈ Z3 outputs an accepting protocol transcript
the distribution of which is computationally indistinguishable from real protocol
transactions with an honest prover for challenge c.
0. The simulator S computes C0 and C1 like an honest prover, and computes
C2 as a commitment to 0. Then, clearly, the distribution of C0, C1, pi
′, t0, t1
is identical to that in real protocol transcripts. Furthermore, by the compu-
tational hiding property of the commitment scheme Com(.), the distribution
of C2 is computationally indistinguishable from that in real protocol runs.
1. For c = 1, the simulator draws pi
R← Sk, a R← Ik and b R← I`+v. It sets
C0 = Com(pi,A.b⊕y⊕a) and C2 = Com(pi(a)). The value of C1 is computed
as commitments to 0. It easy to see that the openings of C0, C2 pass the
verification equations. To see the correctness of their distributions note that
t2 in the real protocol run and pi(a) in the simulated run are perfectly uni-
form in Ik, and the permutations are also equally distributed both times.
Concerning the opening of C0, note the following: in the real protocol run,
we have t0 = A.v⊕f , where v is uniformly at random, and f = pi−1(t2⊕e);
in the simulated transcript the content of C0 is given by A.(b⊕s)⊕ (a⊕e).
Now, v and b⊕s are both uniformly random, and the terms f and a⊕e are
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uniquely determined by the contents of C0 and C2. Thus, the distributions of
C0, C2 and their openings are perfectly simulated. The distribution of C1 is
computationally indistinguishable by the assumed hiding property of Com(.).
2. Finally, for c = 2, the simulator draws a
R← Ik and b ← Ikw uniformly at
random. It computed C0 as a commitment to 0, C1 = Com(a) and C5 =
Com(a ⊕ b). As before, the distributions of C0 is computationally indistin-
guishable from real protocol runs by the binding property of Com(.), and C1
and C2 as well as their openings can easily be seen to perfectly simulate the
behavior of an honest prover. uunionsq
4.2 Proving Linear Relations
We next describe a Σ-protocol which allows to prove that the messages hid-
den within commitments y1,y2,y2 (where yi = A.(ri‖mi) ⊕ ei) satisfy arbi-
trary linear relations. That is, X1.m1 ⊕ X2.m2 = m3 for arbitrary matrices
X1,X2 ∈ Iv×v. The computational and communication complexity of the pro-
tocol is roughly the same as for proving the knowledge of the three committed
messages using the protocol from the previous section, proving that they also
satisfy the linear relation comes almost for free.
The high level idea of the protocol is as follows. P and V run the protocol from
the previous section to prove knowledge of m1,m2,m3 for all the messages in
parallel (but using the same challenge for all three). Recall that (oversimplifying
a bit by ignoring the issue with the errors, i.e., the challenge c = 2) this protocol
goes as follows: P commits to three random messages v1,v2,v3, and later opens
the vi’s (if c = 0) or vi ⊕mi (if c = 1). We change this protocol now a bit,
and instead choosing v3 at random we compute it as v3 = X1.v1 ⊕ X2.v2.
Moreover the verifier now additionally checks if v3
?
= X1.v1 ⊕X2.v2 (if c = 0)
and if (v3⊕m3) ?=X1.(v1⊕m1)⊕X2.(v2⊕m2) (if c = 1). With these changes,
we get a stronger soundness property: not only can we extract the committed
messagesmi from accepting answers to both challenges, but they will also satisfy
m3 = X1.m1 ⊕X2.m2. At the same time the zero-knowledge property is not
weakened, except of course for leaking the fact that the mi’s satisfy this linear
relation.
The protocol flow is defined as follows:
– P samples permutations pi1, pi2, pi3 at random.
It then draws v1,v2
R←Iv, u1,u2,u3 R←I`, f1,f2,f3 R←Ik, sets v3 = X1.v1⊕
X2.v2 and then sends the following commitments for i = 1, 2, 3 to the verifier
V:
Ci0 ← Com(pi′i = pii, ti0 = A.(ui‖vi)⊕ f i)
Ci1 ← Com(ti1 = pii(f i))
Ci2 ← Com(ti2 = pii(f i ⊕ ei))
– The verifier draws c
R← Z3 and sends it to P.
– Depending on the value of c, P opens the following commitments:
0. P opens Ci0, Ci1 by sending pi
′
i, ti0, ti1 and the associated random coins.
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1. P opens Ci0, Ci2 by sending pi
′
i, ti0, ti2 and the associated random coins.
2. P opens Ci1, Ci2 by sending ti1, ti2 and the associated random coins.
– The verifier verifies the correctness of the openings received from the prover,
and additionally performs the following checks depending on the challenge
c:
0. V accepts, iff pi′i
?∈ Sk, there exist solutions (ai, bi) ∈ I` × Iv to the
equations ti0 ⊕ pi′−1i (ti1) = A.(ai‖bi) and they satisfy b3 = X1.b1 ⊕
X2.b2.
1. V accepts, iff there exist solutions (ci,di) ∈ I` × Iv to the equations
ti0 ⊕ pi′−1i (ti2)⊕ yi = A.(ci‖di) and they satisfy d3 = X1.d1 ⊕X2.d2.
2. V accepts, iff ‖ti1 ⊕ ti2‖1 ?= w.
Theorem 4.2. The above protocol is a Σ-protocol for the following relation:
RLLPN =
{
((A,X1,X2,y1,y2,y3), (r1, r2, r3,m1,m2,m3, e1, e2, e3)) :
3∧
i=1
(
yi = A.(ri‖mi)⊕ ei ∧ ‖ei‖1 = w
)
∧ m3 = X1.m1 ⊕X2.m2
}
.
As we can turn any commitment y = A.(r‖m)⊕e for an (unknown) message m
into a commitment for the message m⊕x as y⊕A.(0`‖x) = A.(r‖(m⊕x))⊕e.
Our protocol directly implies a protocol for affine relations
RALPN =
{(
(A,X1,X2, {xi,yi}3i=1), ({ri,mi, ei}3i=1)
)
:
3∧
i=1
(
yi = A.(ri‖mi)⊕ ei ∧ ‖ei‖1 = w
)
∧ (m3 ⊕ x3) = X1.(m1 ⊕ x1)⊕X2.(m2 ⊕ x2)
}
.
In particular, this allows to prove that m1 = 1
v ⊕m2, i.e., m1 is the bitwise
negation of m2. Furthermore, the protocol can be seen to directly generalize to
relations among more than 3 secret messages as well.
Proof. We do not give a full proof here, as it is very similar to that of Theo-
rem 4.1. Besides technicalities, the only difference is to prove that the extracted
witnesses indeed satisfy the required linear relation.
This can be seen as follows. From the verification equations of c = 0 and c = 1
we first get that yi = A.(ai⊕ci‖bi⊕di)⊕pi′−1i (ti1⊕ti2), where the second addend
has low weight by the same arguments as earlier. Using the linear relations among
the bi and the di we further get (b3⊕d3) = X1.(b1⊕d1)⊕X2.(b2⊕d2). Thus,
a valid witness is given by r′i = ai ⊕ ci, m′i = bi ⊕ di and e′i = pi′−1i (ti1 ⊕ ti2).
To see that the protocol is still honest-verifier zero-knowledge it suffices to
note that the only additional information the verifier learns is that the random
coins used in the protocol and the secret witnesses satisfy the linear relation
which is already part of the description of the relation RLLPN . The rest of the
protocol is just a parallel execution of independent instances of the protocol for
RLPN . uunionsq
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4.3 Proving Multiplicative Relations
Finally, we present a protocol which can be used to prove a bitwise relation
amongst commitments y1,y2,y3 (where yi = A.(ri‖mi)⊕ei). That is, it allows
one to prove that the messages satisfy m3 = m1 ◦m2. The main idea of the
protocol is to reduce the task of proving this multiplicative relation to a linear
one, which we showed how to solve in the last section.
In the protocol, which is given in detail below, the prover P first samples
vectors m˜1, m˜2, m˜3
R←I4v such that (1) m˜3 = m˜1◦m˜2 and (2) for all (a, b) ∈ I2
the number of indices j ∈ {1, . . . , 4v} satisfying (m˜1[j], m˜2[j]) = (a, b) is exactly
v. Further, the prover draws a random matrix R
R← Iv×4v with full rank such
that each row has Hamming weight exactly 1 and such that R.m˜i = mi for
i = 1, 2, 3 (so R is a v× v permutation matrix with 3v additional zero columns).
Now P and V basically run the protocol from the previous section to prove
the linear relation R.m˜i = mi, with the crucial difference that the relation R is
not know to V, instead the prover additionally sends a commitment to R with
the first message. Moreover P sends commitments to the m˜i’s to V.
The challenge space is extended from Z3 to Z4 (but will later merge c = 2
and c = 3 and get back to 3). If c ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the prover opens the commitment
to R and sends the same answer as he would in the the protocol for proving
the linear relation R.m˜i = mi for the given c. If c = 3, the prover opens the
commitments to the m˜i’s, and V checks if m˜3
?
= m˜1 ◦ m˜2.
The soundness of this protocol follows as R.m˜i = mi and m˜3 = m˜1 ◦ m˜2
together imply the claimed statement m3 = m1 ◦m2.
The zero knowledge property holds as even though R together with the m˜i’s
determines the mi’s, each by itself is completely independent of the mi’s, and
we never open both.
Finally, we observe that in our protocol for proving linear relations, the veri-
fier does not need to know the linear relation R if c = 2. So we can collapse the
challenges c = 2 and c = 3 as described above, but not open R in this case.
Formally, the protocol flow is defined by the following algorithms:
– P samples m˜1, m˜2, m˜3
R←I4v such that m˜3 = m˜1 ◦m˜2 and such that for all
(a, b) ∈ I2 the number of indices j ∈ {1, . . . , 4v} satisfying (m˜1[j], m˜2[j]) =
(a, b) is exactly v. Further, the prover draws a random matrix R
R← Iv×4v
with full rank such that each row has at most Hamming weight 1 and such
that R.m˜i = mi for i = 1, 2, 3.
In the following we denote the jth v-bit block of m˜i by m˜
j
i , i.e., m˜
j
i =
(m˜iu)
jv
u=(j−1)v+1. Similarly, R
j denotes the matrix given by columns (j −
1)v + 1 to jv of R.
In the remainder of this protocol description all computations are done for
i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively.
P draws r˜ji
R← I` and defines auxiliary images as y˜ji = A.(r˜ji‖m˜ji ) ⊕ e˜ji for
e˜ji
R←Ikw. It then samples permutations pii, piji ← Sk at random.
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It then draws vji
R←Iv, ui,uji R←I`, f i,f ji R←Ik, sets vi =
∑4
j=1 R
j .vji and
then sends the following commitments to the verifier V:
C˜ ← Com(y˜′11 = y˜11, . . . , y˜′43 = y˜43) CR ← Com(R′ = R)
Ci0 ← Com(pi′i = pii, ti0 = A.(ui‖vi)⊕ f i)
Ci1 ← Com(ti1 = pii(f i)) Ci2 ← Com(ti2 = pii(f i ⊕ ei))
Cji0 ← Com(pi′ji = piji , tji0 = A.(uji‖vji )⊕ f ji )
Cji1 ← Com(tji1 = piji (f ji )) Cji2 ← Com(tji2 = piji (f ji ⊕ e˜ji ))
– The verifier draws c
R← Z3 and sends it to P.
– Depending on the value of c, P opens the following commitments:
0. P opens Ci0, Ci1, C
j
i0, C
j
i1, CR by sending pi
′
i, ti0, ti1, pi
′j
i , t
j
i0, t
j
i1,R
′ and
the associated random coins.
1. P opens Ci0, Ci2, C
j
i0, C
j
i2, C˜, CR by sending pi
′
i, ti0, ti2, pi
′j
i , t
j
i0, t
j
i2, y˜
′j
i ,R
′
and the associated random coins.
2. P opens Ci1, Ci2, C
j
i1, C
j
i2, C˜ by sending ti1, ti2, t
j
i1, t
j
i2, y˜
′j
i and the asso-
ciated random coins.
– The verifier verifies the correctness of the openings received from the prover,
and additionally performs the following checks depending on the challenge
c:
0. V accepts, iff pi′i, pi
′j
i
?∈Sk, there exist solutions (ai, bi), (aji , bji ) ∈ I`×Iv
to the equations ti0 ⊕ pi′−1i (ti1) = A.(ai‖bi) and tji0 ⊕ (pi′ji )−1(tji1) =
A.(aji‖bji ), respectively, which satisfy bi =
∑4
j=1 R
′j .bji .
1. V accepts, iff R′ has full rank and each row has Hamming weight at most
1, and iff there exist solutions (ai, bi), (a
j
i , b
j
i ) ∈ I`×Iv to the equations
ti0⊕pi′−1i (ti2)⊕yi = A.(ai‖bi) and tji0⊕ (pi′ji )−1(tji2)⊕ y˜′ji = A.(aji‖bji ),
respectively, which satisfy bi =
∑4
j=1 R
′j .bji .
2. V accepts, iff ‖ti1 ⊕ ti2‖1 = ‖tji1 ⊕ tji2‖1 ?= w, y˜′ji ?= A.(r˜ji‖m˜ji ) ⊕ e˜ji ,
‖e˜ji‖1 ?= w and m˜j1 ◦ m˜j2 ?= m˜j3.
Theorem 4.3. The above protocol is a Σ-protocol for the following relation:
RMLPN =
{
((A,y1,y2,y3), (r1, r2, r3,m1,m2,m3, e1, e2, e3)) :
3∧
i=1
(yi = A.(ri‖mi)⊕ ei ∧ ‖ei‖1 = w) ∧ m3 = m1 ◦m2
}
.
Proof. The 3-move form of the protocol is easy to see. Furthermore, completeness
directly follows from the construction and can easily be verified.
Special soundness. Concerning the special soundness of the protocol, note the
following. Using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can
extract openings m′i, r
′
i and e
′
i of the yi, and similarly, we get m˜
′j
i , r˜
′j
i and e˜
′j
i
which are valid openings for the y˜′ji . Now, by the same arguments as in Theo-
rem 4.2 we can further infer that m′i =
∑4
i=1 R
′j .m˜′ji = R
′.m˜′i. Furthermore,
we know that m˜′1 ◦ m˜′2 = m˜′3. Now, because of the special form of R′, we can
finally infer that the same relation must also be true for the m′i.
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Honest-verifier zero-knowledge. We do not give a full simulator here, but only
give the intuition why the protocol is zero-knowledge. Clearly, the m˜ji are uni-
formly random in their domain, and do not leak any information about the mi,
as long as the matrix R is kept secret. Similarly, if the m˜ji are kept secret, the
matrix R itself is a uniformly random matrix of full rank with the specified
restriction on the weight of its rows. Computationally this still holds true even
if the y˜ji are revealed, as they are pseudorandom by Theorem 3.1. The zero-
knowledge property now follows from that of the protocol for RLLPN . uunionsq
4.4 Proving Arbitrary Relations
We finally briefly explain how one can use the protocols presented in this section
to prove that committed valuesm0,m1 satisfym0 = C(m1) for an arbitrary cir-
cuit C. Let C1, . . . , Cd denote the layers of C, i.e., C(m1) = Cd(. . . C1(m1) . . .),
where we assume that each Ci is either a linear function or a bitwise operation
(e.g., bitwise NAND). For simplicity we assume the number of input and output
wires to each Ci is `, where ` is the length of the underlying LPN problem.
We use our string commitment scheme to commit to the values in the interme-
diate layers, i.e., to strings x1, . . . ,xd where x1 = m1,x2 = C1(m1), . . . ,xd =
C(m1) (note that we already have commitments to x1 = m1 and xd = m0).
Now we use our Σ-protocols to prove that xi+1 = Ci(xi) for i = 1 . . . d− 1.
The total communication complexity of this protocol is Θ(
∑ |Ci|` log `) =
Θ(|C|` log `), the soundness error is 2/3, and thus for most applications must be
lowered by (parallel) repetition.
5 Conclusions and Open Problems
We presented a very simple and efficient string commitment scheme, whose se-
curity is based on the hardness of the LPN-problem, or, equivalently, on the
hardness of decoding random linear codes. We further presented Σ-protocols
which allow one to prove arbitrary relations among secret values mi, i.e., m0 =
C(m1, . . . ,mu) for any circuit C. The size of a proof is only quasi-linear in the
length of the committed messages.
We introduced an “exact” version of the LPN-problem which is polynomially
equivalent to the standard LPN problem. This new assumption might be of inde-
pendent interest as basing existing LPN based schemes on this new assumptions
removes the completeness error (cf. §2 for a discussion).
It would be interesting to find protocols which already achieve a small knowl-
edge error in only run, and do not rely on repetitions. Furthermore, a tighter
reduction for the hardness of the decisional xLPN problem, in particular not
relying on the Goldreich-Levin theorem, would be desirable.
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A A Gap in the Proof of Ve´ron’s Protocol [Ve´r96]
We now briefly present the protocol of Ve´ron [Ve´r96] and show where the gap in
his proof is. We here write Ikw to denote the subset of Ik with Hamming weight
equal to w.
Let P,V get common input A ∈ Ik×`,y ∈ Ik, and P gets s ∈ I`, e ∈ Ikw such
that A.s⊕ e = y as a private input. The protocol flow is then given as follows:
– P samples v
R←I`,f R←Ik (note that f is uniformly random) and a random
permutation σ
R←Sk. P then sends commitments C0, C1, C2 to V, where
C0 ← Com(σ′ = σ)
C1 ← Com(t1 = σ(A.(v ⊕ s)))
C2 ← Com(t2 = σ(A.v ⊕ y))
– The verifier draws c
R← Z3 and sends it to P.
– Depending on the value of c, P opens the following commitments:
0. P opens C0, C1 by sending σ
′, t1 and the associated random coins.
1. P opens C0, C2 by sending σ
′, t2 and the associated random coins.
2. P opens C1, C2 by sending t1, t2 and the associated random coins.
– The verifier verifies the correctness of the openings received from the prover,
and additionally performs the following checks depending on the challenge
c:
0. V accepts, iff σ′−1(t1)
?∈ img A.
1. V accepts, iff σ′−1(t2)⊕ y
?∈ img A.
2. V accepts, iff ‖t1 ⊕ t2‖1 ?= w.
The gap. The gap in the proof of security of this protocol is in the part of
the zero-knowledge property. More precisely, the simulator in the case of c = 2
samples σˆ
R← Sk, a R← I` and eˆ R← Ikw and sets tˆ1 = σˆ(A.a) and tˆ2 := t1 ⊕
σˆ(eˆ). In the paper it is argued that given A and y both tˆ1 and tˆ2 follow the
same distribution as t1 and t2 in real protocol runs. While this is true for each
one individually (as shown in the paper), it is not proven for the combined
distribution of (tˆ1, tˆ2).
At a more intuitive level, in the case of c = 2, the verifier is given t1 =
σ(A.(v ⊕ s)) and t2 = σ(A.v ⊕ y) and therefore σ(e) as well. However, the
former gives some information about σ because A.(v⊕s) is not a random vector
for a fixed A, as for instance A might be such that all its images have their last
coordinates equal to 0. This leaks some information about σ and thus about e
as well, and therefore we cannot prove perfect zero knowledge for this case as
claimed.
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B A Protocol for the Standard LPN-Problem
As mentioned in the main part of the paper, the hardness of the xLPN-problem
holds assuming the hardness of the standard LPN-problem, but the reduction is
not tight, as it is based on the Goldreich-Levin theorem. In the following we thus
present an alternative to our commitment scheme and protocol, whose security
is directly based on the standard LPN-problem. The protocol has a knowledge
error of 4/5, and thus running the protocol twice in parallel roughly achieves the
same knowledge error as the protocols in Section 4. Depending on the concrete
parameters being used, either of the solutions may be more efficient.
We first note that under the LPNτ -problem still remains hard if the weight
of the error e is limited by twice its expectation value, where Berτ denotes the
Bernoulli distribution with parameter τ :
Lemma B.1. The following two probability distributions are statistically indis-
tinguishable:
{(A,A.x⊕ e)} and {(A,A.x⊕ f)},
where A
R←Ik×m, e R←Berkτ , f R←Berkτ conditioned on ‖f‖1 ≤ 2τk, and x R←Im
is fixed and secret.
Proof. Let r ← Berkτ . Hoeffding’s inequality then states that Pr[‖r‖1 ≥ (τ +
ε)k] ≤ e−2ε2k. Setting ε = τ we get that Pr[‖r‖1 ≥ 2τk] ≤ e−2τ2k. Thus the
statistical difference of the two random ensembles is bounded above by 2e−2τ
2k,
which is negligible for any fixed 0 < τ ≤ 1. uunionsq
Having this, it is straightforward to see that Theorem 3.1 literally holds true
even if the error of the commitment scheme is drawn as e
R← Berkτ conditioned
on ‖f‖1 ≤ 2τk, as long as the matrix A has minimal distance at least 4 bτke
(instead of 2 bτke stated there).
We next describe the Σ-protocol for proving knowledge of a valid opening of
a commitment under this variant. The constructions for linear and multiplicative
relations from Sections 4.2 and 4.3 can easily be adapted for this setting as well.
In contrast to the protocols given in the main part of this paper, the protocol
has knowledge error 4/5 instead of 2/3, which again can be reduced arbitrarily
by parallel repetition.
In the description we write Skw for the set of all k×k-matrices of rank k−w,
where each column and each row has at most Hamming weight 1. One can think
of Skw as all mappings that send w indices to 0, and permute the remaining k−w
ones.te the remaining k − w ones.
– P samples a σ˜
R←Skw satisfying σ˜(e) = 0 and a permutation pi at random. It
defines σ = σ˜.pi−1.
It then draws v
R←I`+v, f R←Ik, and then sends the following commitments
to the verifier V:
C0 ← Com(pi′ = pi, t0 = A.v ⊕ f) C1 ← Com(t1 = pi(f))
C2 ← Com(t2 = pi(f ⊕ e)) C3 ← Com(σ′ = σ)
C4 ← Com(t4 = σ˜(f)) C5 ← Com(t5 = σ˜(f ⊕ e))
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– The verifier draws c
R← Z5 and sends it to P.
– Depending on the value of c, P opens the following commitments:
0. P opens C0, C1 by sending pi
′, t0, t1 and the associated random coins.
1. P opens C0, C2 by sending pi
′, t0, t2 and the associated random coins.
2. P opens C1, C3, C4 by sending t1, σ
′, t4 and the associated random coins.
3. P opens C2, C3, C5 by sending t2, σ
′, t5 and the associated random coins.
4. P opens C4, C5 by sending t4, t5 and the associated random coins.
– The verifier verifies the correctness of the openings received from the prover,
and additionally performs the following checks depending on the challenge
c:
0. V accepts, iff t0 ⊕ pi′−1(t1)
?∈ img A and pi′ ?∈ Sk.
1. V accepts, iff t0 ⊕ pi′−1(t2)⊕ y
?∈ img A.
2. V accepts, iff σ′(t1)
?
= t4 and σ
′ ?∈ Skw.
3. V accepts, iff σ′(t2)
?
= t5.
4. V accepts, iff ‖t4 ⊕ t5‖1 ?= 0.
Theorem B.2. The above protocol is a Σ-protocol for the following relation:
RLPN = {((A,y), (r,m, e)) : y = A.(r‖m)⊕ e ∧ ‖e‖1 ≤ w}
We note that in a straightforward manner our protocol can be modified to
prove claims of the more general form w1 ≤ ‖e‖1 ≤ w2 for 0 ≤ w1 ≤ w2 ≤ k as
well.
Proof. The 3-move form required for Definition 2.4 is clear. The remaining prop-
erties can be seen as follows.
Completeness. It is easy to see that an honest prover can always convince the
verifier. Depending on the challenge c, we get:
0. t0⊕pi′−1(t1) = (A.v⊕f)⊕pi−1(pi(f)) = A.v ∈ img A and pi is a permutation.
1. t0⊕pi′−1(t2)⊕y = (A.v⊕f)⊕pi−1(pi(f⊕e))⊕(A.s⊕e) = A.(v⊕s) ∈ img A.
2. σ′(t1) = σ˜(pi−1(pi(f))) = σ˜(f) = t4 and σ˜ has the correct form.
3. σ′(t2) = σ˜(pi−1(pi(f ⊕ e))) = σ˜(f ⊕ e) = t5.
4. ‖t4 ⊕ t5‖1 = ‖σ(˜f)⊕ σ(˜f ⊕ e)‖1 = ‖σ˜(f ⊕ f ⊕ e)‖1 = ‖σ˜(e)‖1 = ‖0‖1 = 0.
Special Soundness. Assume that we have fixed values C0, . . . , C5 and openings
for all challenges c ∈ Z5, such that the verifier accepts on all of them. Then,
by the assumed perfect binding property of the underlying commitment scheme
Com(.), we know that the openings to identical commitments must be identical
across different challenges.
By adding the verification equations for c = 0 and c = 1 we get that pi′−1(t1⊕
t2) ⊕ y ∈ img A and thus that y = A.s′ ⊕ pi′−1(t1 ⊕ t2), where s′ = (r′‖m′)
is easy to compute. Furthermore, by adding the verification equations for c = 2
and c = 3 we get that σ′(t1 ⊕ t2) = t4 ⊕ t5. Now, using that ‖t4 ⊕ t5‖1 = 0
(from c = 4) and the fact that σ′ is a partial permutation that sends exactly
w coordinates to 0, we can infer that every preimage of t4 ⊕ t5 under σ′ has at
most norm w, resulting in ‖t1 ⊕ t2‖1 ≤ w.
A valid witness of (A,y) is thus given by (r′,m′, pi′−1(t1 ⊕ t2)).
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Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge. In the following we describe an efficient simu-
lator S, which for each challenge c ∈ Z5 outputs an accepting protocol transcript
the distribution of which is computationally indistinguishable from real protocol
transactions with an honest prover for challenge c.
0. The simulator S computes C0 and C1 like an honest prover, and computes
C2, . . . , C5 as independent commitments to 0. Then, clearly, the distribution
of C0, C1, pi
′, t0, t1 is identical to that in real protocol transcripts. Further-
more, by the computational blinding property of the commitment scheme
Com(.), the distribution of C2, . . . , C5 is computationally indistinguishable
from that in real protocol runs.
1. For c = 1, the simulator draws pi
R← Sk, a R← Ik and b R← I`+v. It sets
C0 = Com(pi,A.b⊕ y ⊕ a) and C2 = Com(pi(a)). All other commitments are
computed as commitments to 0. It easy to see that the openings of C0, C2
pass the verification equations. To see the correctness of their distributions
note that t2 in the real protocol run and pi(a) in the simulated run are
perfectly uniform in Ik, and the permutations are also equally distributed
both times. Concerning the opening of C0, note the following: in the real
protocol run, we have t0 = A.v ⊕ f , where v is uniformly at random, and
f = pi−1(t2 ⊕ e); in the simulated transcript the content of C0 is given by
A.(b⊕ s)⊕ (a⊕ e). Now, v and b⊕ s are both uniformly random, and the
terms f and a ⊕ e are uniquely determined by the contents of C0 and C2.
Thus, the distributions of C0, C2 and their openings are perfectly simulated.
Again, the distribution of the remaining commitments is computationally
indistinguishable by the assumed blinding property of Com(.).
2. First, S draws σ′ R←Skw and a← Ik. It sets C1 = Com(a), C3 = Com(σ′) and
C4 = Com(σ
′(a)). All other commitments are computed as commitments to
0. Clearly, the distribution C1, C3, C4 and the openings are perfectly correct.
As before, the C0, C2, C5 are computationally indistinguishable from those
in real protocol runs by the properties of Com(.).
3. Here, S draws σ′ R←Skw and a← Ik. It sets C1 = Com(a), C2 = Com(σ′) and
C5 = Com(σ
′(a)). All other commitments are computed as commitments to
0. Clearly, the distribution C2, C3, C5 and the openings are perfectly correct.
As before, the C0, C1, C4 are computationally indistinguishable from those
in real protocol runs by the hiding property of Com(.).
4. Finally, for c = 4, the simulator draws σ′ R← Skw, and draws a R← Ik and
b
R← Ikw such that σ′(b) = 0. It computed C0, . . . , C3 as commitments to 0,
C4 = Com(σ
′(a)) and C5 = Com(σ′(a ⊕ b)). As before, the distributions of
C0, . . . , C3 are computationally indistinguishable from real protocol runs by
the binding property of Com(.), and C4 and C5 as well as their openings can
easily be seen to perfectly simulate the behavior of an honest prover. uunionsq
